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THE DUTCH EAST INDIES AND THE REORIENTATION 
OF DUTCH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, 1929-40*
Erik Hansen
Between 1919 and the German occupation of the Netherlands in May 
1940, the Dutch social democratic movement gradually experienced a pro­
found internal transformation. Cautious reformist elements had always 
been strong in the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiderspartij (SDAP--Social 
Democratic Workers' Party), and with the passage of time their strength 
continued to increase; left-opposition elements were purged from the 
party, first in 1909 and again in 1932, so that whatever strength revo­
lutionary Marxist elements might have had within the party was dissi­
pated. Throughout the 1920s, the SDAP leadership slowly and painfully 
gravitated toward a pragmatic, ethical, and parliamentary socialism 
which stressed the primacy of law, due process, civil liberties, and 
political democracy. The change on occasion entailed brutal debate.
When the depression broke in 1929, the SDAP found itself incapable 
of generating a positive political or economic response. Only in 1934, 
under pressure from rising levels of unemployment, the threat of fas- 
cistic movements of the radical right, and competition on the left 
from various revolutionary groups including the Communist Party, did 
the party seek a solution in planisme.1 The movement to planisme 
served a dual purpose. By presenting an antidepression program which 
provided for a high degree of economic planning within a capitalist 
framework, the SDAP sought to attract middle-class elements who had 
traditionally voted for bourgeois parties. At the same time, the party 
could continue to stress its democratic, parliamentary commitments 
against the radical left and right. This attempt to break into new 
constituencies in Dutch society failed, and on the eve of the German 
occupation the SDAP remained a basically working-class party.
Frustration in Europe was paralleled by failure in the Dutch East 
Indies.* 12 Between the two world wars, the SDAP failed to foster a strong
*1 would like to express my appreciation to Mevrouw J. M. Welcker and Mejuff- 
vrouw Mies Campfens of the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, for 
their continued aid and advice in the preparation of this and other essays.
1In December 1933, the Belgian Labor Party adopted an antidepression program 
which entailed extensive governmental planning. This Plan van den Arbeid, as it came 
to be known, was largely the work of Hendrik de Man. For three scholarly accounts of 
the planisme experience in Belgium, see Peter Dodge, Beyond Marxism: The Faith and 
Works of Hendrik de Man (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966); Mieke Claeys-Van Haegendoren, 
Hendrik de Man: Biografie (Antwerp-Utrecht: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1972); and 
Mieke Claeys-Van Haegendoren, 25 jaar Belgisahe Soaialisme. Evolutie van de verhouding 
van de Belgisahe Werkliedenpartij tot de parlementaire demooratie in Belgie van 1914 
tot 1940 (Antwerp: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1967).
2For an excellent discussion of the colonial policy of the SDAP during the
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social democratic movement in the Indies; social democracy remained the 
ideology of a relatively small number of European employees, usually 
white-collar and often part of the official colonial apparatus itself.3 *
Moreover, the SDAP remained very cool toward the Indonesian nationalist 
movement which it tended to regard as a bourgeois, antisocialist force. 
Finally, despite the framing of a formal colonial program in 1930 (see 
below, p p . 70-76), the Indies were never of central concern to the 
party leadership. Even at the height of the planisme drive (1934-37), 
the party's reform proposals for the Indies were quite modest when com­
pared with the program advanced for the Dutch polity. It is the pur­
pose of this paper to trace the development of the SDAP within the con­
text of Dutch politics and to demonstrate how the SDAP's position 
regarding the Indies--in fact the amount of attention given the matter 
at all--was dependent on personalities, internal Dutch affairs, and 
European/global economic developments.
Opposition Parties in Dutch Society and Politics
From its origins in 1894 until 1939, the SDAP was permanently an 
opposition party. When it finally entered a cabinet, the 1939 De Geer 
cabinet--which was in essence a government of national union forced 
upon parliament by the rapidly deteriorating European situation--the 
SDAP enjoyed the dubious distinction of being the last major social 
democratic party in Europe to wield a measure of national-level execu­
tive power. At bottom, this impotence derived from the peculiarities 
of Dutch social structure and political traditions. In the first 
place, the Netherlands lacked the heavy industrial populations charac­
teristic of Germany, Belgium, and Great Britain. Out of a total popu­
lation of 7,935,565 in 1930, 3,185,816 persons were registered in the 
labor force. Of this number, only 1,235,912 were listed in the indus­
trial and craft sector; agriculture accounted for 639,026, transporta­
tion for 296,737, and commercial and retail activity 398,718. Another 
243,555 persons were employed in the domestic service sector.* In 
effect, industrial labor represented only about one-third of the n a ­
tion. Even this third, scattered over a broad spectrum of often quite 
small craft and manufacturing units, was highly fragmented. Only in 
the Twente textile centers did one find large industrial concentra­
tions. The two key cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were above all 
financial and transit centers, not the sites of heavy industry.
Secondly, if in its broad contours the socioeconomic structure of 
Dutch society was comparable to those of the Scandinavian countries, 
the same was not true of its ideological tendencies. The Scandinavian 
societies were religiously homogeneous and contained powerful secular 
or anticlerical currents. The population of the Netherlands, on the 
other hand, was 34.4 percent Dutch Reformed, 8 percent Gereformeerde, 
36.4 percent Roman Catholic, and 1.4 percent Jewish. Other Christian
1920s, see Margriet Dutilh, "Het Koloniaal Beginselprogram van de SDAP, 1919-1930" 
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Leiden, 1971). The Dutilh essay ends with the SDAP 
colonial congress of 1930.
3See ibid., p. 60, for the judgment of Dutilh.
^Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Rijk in Europa. Jaaraigfers 1940 (The 
Hague: Landsdrukkerij, 1942), pp. 100-101.
61
sects accounted for 5.4 percent of the population, while only 14.4 per­
cent were registered in the 1930 census as having no confession.5 
Religious antagonisms and minority fears had led to the formation of 
clerical parties during the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
Vertical cleavages according to confession were often powerful enough 
to impel workers, particularly those of Roman Catholic background, to 
vote along religious lines.6 Clerical politics thus compounded the 
SDAP's difficulty in taking advantage of the implementation of univer­
sal suffrage after World War I .
Third, confronted with small productive units, a massive white- 
collar and retail sector, and politically mobilized religious groups, 
the SDAP also faced political competition of a rather unusual kind.7 
By the time the depression crisis broke in 1929, the Liberal movement 
had long since shattered into three separate parties. The Roman Catho­
lic State Party spoke on behalf of the nation's Catholic minority.
The Christian Historical Union represented the more latitudinarian 
elements in the Dutch Reformed'Church, the Calvinist bourgeoisie, and, 
to a certain extent, rural Calvinists in the northern provinces. Its 
direct rival for Protestant votes was the Antirevolutionary Party, 
which drew support from the strict membership of the Gereformeerde 
churches. Unlike the Christian Historical Union, the Antirevolutionary 
Party tended to be urban and petit bourgeois in its electoral base. In 
1917, the Liberal community came to accept the principle that private 
confessional schools could be subsidized on a parity with state schools. 
As this understanding, or "pacification" as it came to be known, took 
effect, a major barrier to Clerical-Liberal coalitions was suddenly 
removed. As neither of the two Protestant parties, nor the right wing 
of the Roman Catholic State Party, differed dramatically from the 
rather conservative political and economic views of the Liberals, it 
became easy for them to form the series of coalitions, excluding the 
SDAP, which governed the Netherlands during the depression decade.
These coalitions were synthesized and dominated by the towering 
figure of Hendrik Colijn.8 The son of a small farmer in Haarlemmermeer, 
Colijn had risen through the ranks of the colonial administration in 
the Dutch East Indies, had become deeply involved in land companies, 
and eventually joined the board of directors of the Batavian Oil Com­
pany. Just before World War I, Colijn returned to the Netherlands and 
entered politics as a protege of Dr. Abraham Kuyper, the titular head 
of the Antirevolutionary Party. After the war, Colijn emerged as the
5lMd., p. 52.
6For a lucid discussion of Dutch society in historical perspective see Johan 
Goudsblom, Dutch Society (New York: Random House, 1967).
7There is a growing literature of an Anglo-Dutch character on the development 
of the Dutch party system. Among the better English language introductions are:
Robert Bone, "The Dynamics of Dutch Politics," Journal of Politics, XXIV (February 
1962), pp. 23-49; Hans Daalder, "Parties and Politics in the Netherlands," Political 
Studies, III (January 1955), pp. 1-16; and Hans Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition 
in a Segmented Society," in Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democ­
racies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 188-236.
8The following discussion of Colijn is based upon Louis de Jong, Het Koninkrijk 
der Nederlanden in de tweede wereIdoorlog3 Vol. I, Voorspel (The Hague: Nijhoff,
1969), pp. 195-203.
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leader of this party. Between August 1929 and August 1939 five coali­
tions governed the Netherlands, the last four of which he personally 
headed.9 The first coalition, headed by Ruys de Beerenbrouck, lasted 
from August 10, 1929 to May 26, 1933 and was constituted on a purely 
clerical basis. But Colijn's coalitions, with the notable exception 
of the June 1937-July 1939 combination, embodied not only these cleri­
cal forces, but always included at least one Liberal. Colijn was the 
prime spokesman for toughness in the colonies and inflexible "law and 
order" at home. Strongly anticommunist, antisocialist, and quite hos­
tile to the trade union movement in general, his response to the de­
pression crisis was to drive toward balanced budgets, to curtail 
spending and social services, and to insist on stern adherence to the 
gold standard. (It was not until 1936, after considerable pain and 
soul-searching, that the nation finally devalued its currency.) As 
unemployment spread, the Colijn coalitions responded with austerity 
budgets and limited public works programs.10 1 Despite the magnitude of 
the crisis, the left-wing forces in Dutch society were unable to radi­
calize public life to any great degree, and the Colijn regimes simply 
rode out the storm. The left's failure is clearly shown by the fact 
that the SDAP received 23.8 percent of the popular vote in the parlia­
mentary election of 1929, 21.4 percent in 1933, and 21.9 percent in 
1937.11
While the SDAP was frozen in opposition the Nederlands Verbond 
van Vakverenigingen (NVV--Netherlands' Trade Union Federation) barely 
managed to maintain its hard-won position. Between 1930 and 1939, NVV 
membership fluctuated between 251,000 and a peak of 336,000, achieved 
in 1933.12 In 1939, the Protestant Christelijk National Vakverbond 
had 118,900 members, and the Rooms Katholiek Werklieden Verbond over 
186,000.13 As might be suspected from these figures, the religious 
fragmentation of the labor movement precluded much effective broad- 
based trade union action; in fact, the various trade unions generally 
looked to their related political parties rather than to each other 
for policy guidelines on problems of a macroeconomic nature.
The Situation in the Indies
Confronted with serious constraints in the Netherlands, the SDAP 
faced even more severe problems in the Dutch East Indies, where whites
9The appendix to ibid., pp. 727-31, lists the prime ministers and their cabi­
nets, 1918-40.
10For brief discussions of the unemployment problem see Frits de Jong, Om de 
plaats van de arbeid (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1956), pp. 240-47; Ger Harmsen and 
Bob Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid. Beknopte gesohiedenis van de neder- 
landse vakbeweging (Nijmegen: Socialistische Uitgeverij Nijmegen, 1975), pp. 172-75; 
and John Windmuller, Labor Relations in the Netherlands (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1969), pp. 66-68.
11 Vers lag over het jaar 1933, p. 42, bound in Verslag van het veertigste aongres 
der Soeiaal-Demoeratisehe Arbeiderspartij in Nederland, and the Verslag over het jaar 
1937, p. 38, bound in Verslag van het vier en veertigste eongres der Soeiaal-Demo- 
aratisahe Arbeiderspartij in Nederland, contain election data.
12Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding, pp. 430-33.
13Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Rijk in Europa. Jaareijfers 1940 (The 
Hague: Landsdrukkerij, 1942), p. 305.
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formed a tiny, highly privileged minority. The 1930 census estimated 
the population of the Indies at just over 60 million, of whom merely
240.000 were Europeans. Of these, around 32,000 were foreign nationals 
while over 208,000 were Dutch, 160,000 of them born in the Indies.19
The agrarian sector of Indonesian society was dominated by Dutch 
land companies throughout the period between the two world wars. On 
the islands of Java and Madura, 1,278,800 hectares out of a total sur­
face area of 13,217,400 hectares were reserved for plantation agricul­
ture alone in 1939.15 Similar patterns existed on the Outer Islands 
as well. As global raw material export markets began to collapse in 
the aftermath of the 1929 fiscal crisis, Dutch and other European land 
syndicates quickly started a systematic reduction in production levels. 
Growing unemployment in the urban sector, particularly a sharply de­
clining demand for coolie labor, cutbacks in estate agriculture, and 
abrupt declines in market price levels all helped to fill the Javanese 
countryside with unemployed former urban laborers, landless rural pro­
letarians, and impoverished small-holders. Indeed, S. J. Rutgers 
argued later than on the eve of World War II the population of rural 
Java constituted a sea of poverty.16
In a colonial environment, highly remunerative jobs naturally went 
to Europeans. According to the 1930 census, out of a total European 
population of 240,000, 85,321 were employed.17 The public service sec­
tor, which included the colonial civil service, police, and military, 
employed over 20,000, followed by oil, minerals, and estate agriculture 
(18,800), commerce (11,415), free professions and education (11,290), 
and transport (10,985).18 By 1939, the Dutch East Indies contained 
7,193 units or workshops classified as factories.19 This classifica­
tion was quite loose; it stretched from actual manufacturing to crafts, 
repair shops, and food and raw material processing plants to motion 
picture theaters. The vast bulk of this sector was European owned and 
managed. Between the European elite and the Indonesian masses lay a 
sizeable Chinese petty bourgeoisie. (In 1930, the Indies contained
1.233.000 Chinese out of a total population of over 60 million.20)
As one might expect in a colonial zone, the local trade union 
movement was quite weak. In the depression years there were several 
trade union federations, but since their memberships were based largely
19Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Indisch Verslag 1940 (Batavia: Landsdruk 
kerij, 1940), p. 17. J. van Gelderen estimates that of these 208,000 Dutch nationals 
only 50,000 were b o m  in Holland, while over 160,000 had been b o m  in the Indies.
See his essay, The Recent Development of Economic Foreign Policy in the Netherlands 
East Indies (London: Longsmans, Green and Co., 1939), p. 4.
1sCentraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Indisch Verslag 1940, pp. 255-56.
16S. L. Rutgers, Ret koloniale systeem in de periode tussen de eerste en de 
tweede wereldoorlog (Amsterdam: Pegasus, 1947), pp. 202-11. As a communist social 
critic, Rutgers was an astute observer of the Indies. This easily overlooked volume 
is blazing with insight.
17Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Indisch Verslag 1940, p. 175.
18Ibid., p. 175. 19Ibid., pp. 316-17. 2°Ibid., p. 42.
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on criteria of religion, ethnic background, and race, they did not 
serve to unify the work force.21 There were two types of nonaffiliated 
trade unions, one European, the other Indonesian. There were a total 
of 111 unions in 1935, a number which declined to 75 by 1939. On the 
other hand, total trade union membership grew from 72,675 to 109,547 
in the same period.22 Yet the large number of unemployed, the controls 
exercised by the state, and the severity of the economic crisis forced
the employed workers to be very docile. In 1939, only 18 strikes, in­
volving 1,628 strikers, were reported on the island of Java.23 *
The Dutch East Indies were perhaps more important to the Dutch 
economy than the colonies of Belgium, France, and Great Britain were 
to their respective metropoles, even though the total percentage of its 
trade with Holland was less than that of some other colonies with their 
colonizers. In 1930, the Indies received 9.4 percent of all Dutch ex­
ports.21* By 1939, this figure had risen to 9.9 percent. Meanwhile,
in 1932, the Dutch East Indies dispatched 32.76 percent of its total
exports to Europe, 11.6 percent to North and South America, and 49.4 
percent to points elsewhere in Asia. By 1939, these figures stood at 
27.8, 20.9, and 34.8 percent, respectively.25 On the other hand, it 
can be said that in the years immediately before World War II the Indies 
filled 21-22 percent of its import needs from the Netherlands, 25 per­
cent from other European suppliers, and 34-40 percent from Asian 
sources.26 Between 1937 and 1939, the American share in Indonesian 
imports rose from 10 to 14 percent.27
Background to the SDAP Colonial Policy
Both the interwar evolution of the SDAP and its general orienta­
tion on colonial policy were partially conditioned by developments 
prior to 1914.28 In 1897, the SDAP had replaced the Bond as the Dutch 
section of the Second International. A splinter party with less than 
a hundred members in 1895, the SDAP had evolved by 1914 into a major 
party claiming 25,708 members. . Between 1897 and 1913, its electorate 
had grown from 10,260 votes to 144,249,29 and its parliamentary delega­
tion from two to sixteen members. Like the other European sections of 
the Second International, the SDAP was torn by the revolutionary/revi­
sionist controversy after the turn of the century. This dispute 
reached a peak in 1909 when an extraordinary party congress at Deventer
21Ibid., p. 254. 22Ibid. 23Ibid.
2UThese figures are derived from calculating the share of the Dutch East Indies
in total Dutch exports on the basis of the data given in the Rijk in Euvopa, volumes
for 1932 and 1940, and the Indisoh Verslagen for 1933 and 1940, respectively.
2sCentraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Indisoh Vevstag 1933, p. 261, contains 
the 1930 data; Indisoh Vevstag 1940, p. 340, contains data for 1939.
26Indisoh Vevstag 1940, p. 339. 27Ibid.
28For a systematic discussion of the origins of the SDAP see D. J. Wansink,
Eet sooidlisme op de tweespvong. De Geboovte van de S.D.A.P. (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 
1939).
29Jaawevstag van den pavtijseovetavis over 1913, pp. 1-3, bound in Vevstag van 
het tuintigste gewone oongves dev S.D.A.P.
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forced the left-opposition leadership out of the party. This action, 
in turn, resulted in the creation of the Sociaal Democratische Partij 
as a Marxian, revolutionary alternative to the SDAP.30 In 1919, this 
party became the Communist Party of Holland. The member sections of 
the Second International were, and remained, quite Euro-centric. Colo­
nial programs and colonial policy, apart from often being the subject 
of lively theoretical debate, were usually not of central concern to 
European Social Democrats. The SDAP was no exception to this rule.
The Belgian, French, German, and British sections of the International 
did virtually nothing to organize colonial populations along social 
democratic lines, and the SDAP was equally inactive in the Dutch East 
Indies.
During the pre-1914 era, SDAP colonial policy was shaped by Henri 
van Kol, a reformist social democrat quite hostile to revolutionary 
ideas.31 Born in 1852, van Kol was of bourgeois origins and a graduate 
of the Delft Technical School. Like so many of the Delft graduates, 
van Kol served as an engineer in the Dutch East Indies colonial bureau­
cracy . During his student years, he had become a socialist by senti­
ment and subsequently joined and supported the Sociaal Democratische 
Bond. After the 1894 split within the Bond, he emerged as one of the 
original founders of the SDAP. In 1897, he was elected to parliament 
and for years afterwards served as the SDAP spokesman on colonial 
policy. For the bulk of his political career, van Kol was not opposed 
to the possession of colonies per se, and it was only during the after- 
math of World War I that he began seriously to support the idea of 
Indonesian independence. Under van Kol's influence, the SDAP did pre­
sent demands for administrative and policy reform in the Dutch East 
Indies, but these demands were of an "ethical" nature and provided for 
neither socialization, independence, nor actual social democratic 
organization in the Indies. It is true that after the turn of the cen­
tury, the Marxist theoretician Pieter Wiedijk attempted to frame a more 
properly social democratic statement of colonial policy but this effort 
had scant results;32 in any event Wiedijk left the SDAP in 1909 to help 
found the Sociaal Democratische Partij.33
The social democratic movement assumed organizational form in the 
Dutch East Indies only in May 1914 and under circumstances which had 
nothing to do with SDAP initiatives.34* In 1912, Henk Sneevliet, the 
chairman of the Dutch Union of Railway and Tram Personnel, left the 
SDAP when the party refused to support the 1911 harbor strike in A m ­
sterdam. The SDAP leadership then placed considerable pressure upon
30Willem Ravesteijn, a member of the De Tribune circle and one of the founders 
of the SDP, surveys its origins and subsequent evolution into the Communist Party of 
Holland in his volume De wording van het Communisme in Nederland (Amsterdam: Van 
Kampen, 1948).
31For a brief survey of van Kol's career as the SDAP colonial expert see my 
"Marxists and Imperialism: The Indonesian Policy of the Dutch Social Democratic 
Workers Party, 1894-1914," Indonesia, 16 (October 1973), pp. 81-104.
32Ibid., pp. 96-101. 23Ibid., p. 101.
31*Ruth McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1965), p. 14. The following discussion of the creation of the ISDV is based 
upon McVey's account.
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the NVV, of which Sneevliet’s federation was a member, to force Snee- 
vliet to resign from his union position. This maneuver was successful 
and Sneevliet departed for the Indies. While employed by a bourgeois 
newspaper in Semarang, he became deeply involved in both social demo­
cratic journalism and the activities of the Indonesian Railroad Workers1 
Union. His considerable organizational skills led to the creation of 
the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging (ISDV). The organization 
was initially dominated by Dutch social democrats and was naturally 
quite small. Its membership only passed a hundred people in 1915. 
Although the majority of its original members were either former or 
continuing members of the SDAP, the ISDV soon evolved along radical 
lines. This evolution led, in turn, to the formation of the reformist 
oriented Indische Sociaal Democratische Partij (ISDP).3 *5
Between 1919 and 1929, the SDAP went through a series of internal 
tensions and transformations. In November 1918, Pieter Jelles Troel- 
stra, the titular head of the SDAP and leader of its parliamentary 
fraction, called for or at least seemed to call for social revolution.36 
While- this call was immediately repudiated by the balance of the party 
leadership, it did create a breach within the party which was only 
smoothed over at the party’s ’’unity” congress in 1919. Immediately 
after the war, the SDAP appointed a socialization commission to develop 
a series of blueprints and policy guidelines for the socialization of 
target industries.37 This was followed in 1923 by a joint SDAP-NVV 
report on industrial codetermination.38 In the meantime, Roel Stenhuis, 
the chairman of the NVV from 1921 to 1928, triggered a long and bitter 
debate within the SDAP when he attempted to force the transformation of 
the SDAP into a labor party along British lines.39 Stenhuis deeply 
antagonized other NVV officials as well as the SDAP regulars, and he 
ultimately was forced to resign his post as NVV chairman. Just as this 
intraparty crisis was passing, a new confrontation began. In 1926,
Edo Fimmen, who was then secretary of the International Transport Work­
e r s ’ Federation, and Pieter Schmidt, who headed the documentation bureau 
of the NVV, began to publish and edit the newspaper Eenheid. Eenheid 
called for an understanding with the communists and cooperation with 
them. Given the bitterly anticommunist orientation of the SDAP, the 
Fimmen and Schmidt initiatives immediately unleashed a dispute which did 
not end until Schmidt and the circle around him were forced to withdraw 
from the SDAP in 1932, forming the left-socialist Onafhankelijk Socia- 
listische Partij.40
33 Ibid., p. 46.
36The November 1918 crisis in the Netherlands is described in great detail by
H. J. Scheffer in his volume, November 1918. Joumaal van een revolutie die niet
doorging (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1968).
37Het Sooialisatievraagstuk. Rapport uitgebracht door de oommissie aangewezen 
uit de S.D.A.P. (Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1920).
3QBedrigfsorganisatie en medezeggenschap. Rapport uitgebracht door de kommissie 
ingesteld door N.V.V. en S.D.A.P. (Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1923).
39H. F. Cohen’s recent monograph, Om de vernieuwing van het socialisme. De 
politieke orientatie van de sociaal-democratie, 1919-1930 (Leiden: Universitaire Pers
Leiden, 1974), pp. 83-158, handles the Stenhuis affair in systematic detail.
40For discussions of the left-opposition, see ibid.y pp. 159-75, and H. van
Hulst, A. Pleysier, and A. Scheffer, Ret roode vaandel volgen wij. Gesohiedenis van
de S.D.A.P. van 1880-1940 (The Hague: Kruseman, 1969), pp. 168-73, 208-13, and 224-33.
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While the confrontation between party leadership and left-opposi­
tion completely dominated party life between 1928 and 1932, our concern 
here is only with its impact upon colonial policy. The left-opposition, 
and particularly Schmidt and his young colleague, the former communist 
Jacques de Kadt, argued that the SDAP must demand immediate independence 
for the Dutch East Indies. This was a demand which the SDAP had never 
articulated and one which the party leadership bitterly resisted. In 
sum, the expulsion of the early left-opposition leaders in 1909, the 
repudiation of Troelstra's revolutionary zeal in 1918, the isolation 
of the left-opposition in 1926-32, and the growing commitment to legis­
lated social reform, anticommunism, and the primacy of the parliamen­
tary institution all served to strengthen an already "moderate" orien­
tation. At the same time, the party continued to grow. From a member­
ship of 37,000 in 1921 it rose to a pre-World War II peak of 91,000 by 
1937.‘*1 In that year, the SDAP electorate reached 890,000. Meanwhile, 
NVV membership dipped from 247,000 in 1920 to 184,000 in 1925, and 
finally stabilized at a level of between 285,000 and 336,000 from 1932 
to 1940.112 Its own conservatism and the nature of its growing domestic 
constituency meant a generally declining interest in the Dutch East 
Indies or in the activities and fate of social democrats there.
Forming a Colonial Policy
Yet, in spite of the SDAP leaders' lack of concern, colonial pol­
icy did become an issue within the party just months before the Wall 
Street financial crisis broke. Prior to World War I, the SDAP had fre­
quently included colonial reform proposals in its election platforms, 
but lacked a formal colonial program. In 1921, a colonial commission 
had been formed to draft just such a program. While the commission com­
pleted its task in 1926, its proposals were not presented to the party 
until an extraordinary congress was called in January 1930 for the ex­
press purpose of considering a colonial program.1** 13 The issue had 
really been forced on the SDAP by two developments: the growing unrest
in the Dutch East Indies, marked by the swift evolution of Indonesian 
communist, Islamic, and nationalist movements, and the simple fact that 
the left-opposition within the SDAP chose to demand immediate indepen­
dence for the Dutch East Indies. These developments were accompanied 
by a generational shift among the party's "colonial experts," which had 
significant consequences for party policy. Even before his death in an 
automobile accident in 1925, van Kol had shown signs of adjusting his 
position on the colonial question. In two essays, Be strijd der
S.B.A.P. op koloniaal gebied and Be Vrijmaking van Nederlandsoh Indie, 
published in 1920 and 1925 respectively, he had argued that the goal 
of SDAP colonial policy should be to prepare the Dutch East Indies for 
eventual independence. His successors' thinking developed in the same
41 Vers lag over het jaar 1938, pp. 14-15, bound in Verslag van het vijf en 
veertigste oongres der Sociaal-Bemocratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland, 'contains 
party membership figures for the depression decade.
U2Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding, pp. 430-33.
1*3There is a brief summary of SDAP colonial policy from its origins to 1930 in
Toeliohting, esp. p. 7, bound in Verslag van het koloniaal oongres der Sooiaal-
Bemooratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland, gehouden op zaterdag 11 en zondag 12 
Januari 1930 te Utrecht.
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direction. The three most important of the younger generation SDAP 
colonial experts were Charles G. Cramer, Jacob van Gelderen, and J. E. 
Stokvis. 44
Charles Cramer was born in the Indies.45 The son of a doctor, he 
studied at the Delft Technical School and then returned to his birth­
place, where he served for years as a hydraulic engineer in the colo­
nial bureaucracy. During his student days, Cramer had become a social 
democrat. After the Volksraad was established in Batavia in 1917, he 
was appointed to it as a social democratic representative. In 1923, 
he moved to the Netherlands and between 1925 and 1937 served as an 
SDAP deputy in the Tweede Kamer (the lower house of the Dutch parlia­
ment). Stokvis first came to the Indies in 1910 as a journalist.46 
For the next seven years he was editor of the liberal, "ethical" news­
paper Be Loeomotief, which was highly critical of the Dutch colonial 
regime. In 1917, he returned home, joined the SDAP, and worked closely 
with van Kol on colonial policy. In 1921, he was named to the party’s 
colonial commission and became its secretary, a job he held for many 
years thereafter. Van Gelderen, born in 1891, was a product of Amster­
dam's Jewish community.47 He received his degree in public administra­
tion in 1909 and went to work in the commercial community. Some years 
later he was appointed to the Statistical Office of the Amsterdam 
municipal administration. His success in this function led to his 
being invited to Batavia in 1919 to organize a central statistical 
office for the colonial regime. In 1928, he became professor of eco­
nomics at the Batavia Law School. Eventually he returned to the 
Netherlands, where he served briefly as the head of the crisis bureau 
in the Ministry of Colonies during the Colijn era. In 1937 he was 
elected to the Tweede Kamer.
It should be noted that in the course of the 1920s the SDAP had 
made some attempt to strengthen its ties with Indonesian political 
forces. In 1926, the Indische Club was established in the Netherlands 
in an attempt to fan social democratic interest in the Indies and to 
establish contact both with Mohammad Hatta's militantly nationalist 
Perhimpunan Indonesia in Holland and with Douwes Dekker's Indische 
Partij in Batavia. In neither case was the Club successful. Its 
activities stirred little interest in the Indies and the Perhimpunan 
Indonesia was more attracted by the Dutch Communist Party's demand for 
immediate Indonesian independence than by the SDAP's gradualism.48 A 
further factor undermining rapport between the SDAP and nationalist 
groups was the SDAP's tendency to argue that such movements generally 
lacked a social democratic character.
The 1922 and 1925 electoral programs of the SDAP both contained 
statements calling for movement towards eventual independence of the
44The following biographical sketches are based upon D. M. G. Koch, Batig slot. 
Figuven uit het oude Indie (Amsterdam: De Brug, 1960). Koch was a Dutch social demo­
crat who spent much of his life in the Indies. As such, he was central to the ISDP 
and had considerable personal contact with Cramer, van Gelderen and Stokvis.
45For an outline of Cramer's career, see ibid, pp. 104-9.
46Koch discusses Stokvis in ibid., pp. 97-103.
47Van Gelderen's career is briefly summarized in ibid., pp. 55-63.
48McVey, The Rise, p. 233.
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Indies, though implying that a lengthy transition period would be 
necessary. In 1929, however, the left-opposition began to press for 
inclusion of "immediate" independence as one clause in the party's 
electoral program. This demand turned the future of the Indies into a 
major issue at the party congress of that year. Pressure from the left 
was rendered the more effective because of the policies of the colonial 
regime, especially the establishment of the Boven Digul penal colony 
for political prisoners. Accordingly, the party adopted the following 
resolution with virtually no discussion or debate.
The congress of the S.D.A.P., held in Nijmegen February 16-18, 1929,
1. With complete agreement and warm sympathy greets the longing of 
the native population of the Dutch East Indies for freedom and 
independence;
2. Accepts as one of the major duties of the Party the task of sup­
porting in a reasonable way the indigenous popular movement 
which strives toward the fulfillment of that longing;
3. Judges that liberation of the Indies population from foreign 
domination can only be reached through the formation of an 
organization and the creation of forces which are able to lead 
an independent Indies.
4. Judges that the indigenous popular movement must be insured the 
necessary freedom to develop itself in public life;
5. Supports the struggle of the Kamer delegation in parliament 
against the policy of force and restriction of personal freedom 
through which the government seeks to repress the Indonesian 
struggle for freedom;
6. Repeats the demand of the Kamer delegation that, apart from the 
realization of the demands laid out in the Strijdprogram and 
election program of the Party, the internment camp on the upper 
Digoel be immediately dismantled, and those interned released 
and returned to their homes; and that amnesty be given to those 
who have been punished for their political activity, and those 
banned and interned as a result of such activity be released;
7. Calls on the Dutch working class to strengthen social democracy 
by supporting with complete dedication and full force the in­
digenous population of the Dutch East Indies in their difficult 
and long struggle for freedom and independence.
In spite of this statement of support and sympathy, it is notice­
able that the party chairman, Jan Oudegeest, who introduced the resolu­
tion on behalf of the Partij Bestuur (PB--the central committee of the 
SDAP), stressed the difference between the SDAP and its ISDP counterpart 
on the one hand and the various Indonesian national movements on the 
other:
[Oudegeest] recalled a discussion in the party secretariat in which 
the possibility of cooperation between the party and Indonesian 
organizations here in Holland was examined. We attempted to find 
each other. The result was that the goal of the party as a class 
organization differed from that of the Indonesians as a national 
organization. With respect for both positions we came to the conclu­
sion that we can fight next to each other and not against each other.* 50
**9Verslag van het vier en dertigste eongres der Soeiaad-Democratische Arbeiders- 
partij in Nederland^ gehouden op zaterdag 16, zondag 17 en maandag 18 Februari 1929 
te Nijmegen, pp. 51-52.
S0Ibid.3 p. 52.
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In the same spirit, Stokvis introduced the colonial clause of the 1929 
electoral program by emphasizing the importance of the democratization 
of the Indies and a rapid movement toward autonomy. "We must develop 
a democratic Volksraad on the basis of its current structure. Next to 
democratization of the Volksraad I would like to place in the election 
program the maintenance of this forum as a general representative body.
. . . [Stokvis] warned against the desires of Colijn who wishes for 
territorial representative bodies and thus a splintering of popular 
Indonesian influence."51 On the issue of the transition period leading 
to eventual independence, Stokvis warned against the use of terms like 
"extended" or "lengthy," arguing that such language could, or would, 
be interpreted to mean "immense" or "interminable." This point in 
Stokvis' presentation seems to have taken Schmidt, the leading party 
spokesman for the "independence now” position, somewhat by surprise.52 
He expressed his pleasure that Stokvis had spoken as he did, and then 
proceeded to introduce an amendment to the Stokvis' resolution, calling 
for immediate independence. As he put it,
The working class cannot expect a single advantage from colonial ex­
ploitation. There is therefore no reason to shelve the question of 
Indonesian independence. Colonial exploitation with its low wages 
and long hours has a harmful influence on the position of workers in 
Europe. Above all, the colonies are the reserve areas of capitalism.
Without colonial domination, capitalism would lose its power.53
In spite of this strong statement, Schmidt eventually yielded to 
pressure from Oudegeest and agreed to reserve his motion for the coming 
special colonial congress. The final version of the colonial clause in 
the SDAP's election program thus read as follows: " . . .  development
to self-government under native leadership, leading to preparation for 
independence of the overseas territories. Elimination of the death 
sentence, corporal punishment, penal sanctions, forced labor, and spe­
cial privileges. Reestablish the right to strike. Freedom to organize, 
assemble and of the press. Democratization of the Volksraad and the 
maintenance of this forum as a general representative body. Broader 
loan policies. Expansion of state enterprise. A greater Indonesian 
share in colonial profits."51*
The Colonial Congress (1930)
The stage was now set for the first and only colonial congress 
that the SDAP would ever hold. The discussions, which opened on Janu­
ary 11, 1930, revolved around twelve propositions introduced by the PB 
as constituting a systematic colonial program. These propositions had 
been drafted by Stokvis and van Gelderen in 1929 and had been approved 
by the SDAP colonial commission of which Stokvis was a member. Since 
van Gelderen was a member of the ISDP as well as of the SDAP, his ac­
tive participation was in a sense expressive of ISDP support. (In 
fact, a virtually identical set of propositions had already been ap­
proved by the ISDP the previous year; representatives of the Indische 
Partij had also been consulted on the wording.) As the delegates were 
seated, the following propositions were presented for their considera­
tion: * 55
*'Ibid.} p. 54. 52Ibid.} p. 56. 53Ibid.,p. 56. 3,*Ibid.} pp. 69-70
S5Verslag van het koloniaat eongres, pp. 46-49, except for Proposition X (seen. 56)
Proposition I
The development and exploitation of foreign markets and produc­
tive territories and the plundering of native peoples there through 
governmental domination is one of the forms of capitalism, generated 
by its very origins, essence, and history.
Proposition II
Recognizing that the development, working and division of the 
world’s natural wealth is in the interest of humanity, social democ­
racy nevertheless rejects governmental domination as a means of pro­
moting this interest.
Her striving toward an international community of free peoples 
entails the dissolution of the colonial relationship, for without 
such dissolution such a community cannot exist.
Proposition III
The way to promote the division of raw materials necessary to 
the globe is through an international agreement which has the effect 
of eliminating the contradictions between the importance of an appro 
priate provision for the economic needs of humanity and the right of 
each people, prepared to take part in this, to self-determination.
Proposition IV
As long as foreign power is not withdrawn, it must be exercised 
with the application of the principle that it leads to national inde 
pendence.
The exercise of foreign power should be subject to the supervi­
sion of the League of Nations, of which the ruling power must be a 
member.
Proposition V
The practice of capitalist colonial policy stands in natural 
opposition to the concept of social democracy.
Just as the mainspring of capitalism in its own national sphere 
is exclusively the quest for profits, so here it uses the state as 
its weapon.
It is thus by nature directed toward an extended maintenance of 
colonial domination.
Proposition VI
The effects of capitalism in a colony are worse than in its own 
country because:
a. The dominated masses, completely or in part bound to a tech­
nically primitive productive mode, can neither economically 
nor socially defend themselves against modern capitalist ex­
ploitation;
b. The masses themselves are usually not aware of the interna­
tional resource exchange value of their land and of their 
labor;
c. In lands with mild climate, rich soil, and primitive produc­
tive relationships, the necessities of life for the natives, 
are as a rule easy to satisfy and thus act as a brake on the 
striving toward a higher standard of living and facilitate 
exploitation;
d. The foreign capitalist directs the exploitation of the colony 
toward the export of capital profits insofar as such are not 
necessary for the maintenance or expansion of profit sources
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and thus prevents a normal increase of the populations income 
and its wealth.
e. A powerful colonial bureaucracy, extremely susceptible to 
capitalist influence, retards the development of democratic 
administration and serves to frustrate the proper development 
of social and governmental reforms;
f. Colonial rule sharpens national and racial conflicts and thus 
impedes normal class formation inside the indigenous commun­
ity, and damages the fighting capacity of the economically 
oppressed;
g. Colonial domination often has the consequence, through the 
penetration of a foreign culture, that the great cultural 
treasures of the natives are regarded as unnecessary;
h. Above all, it is in the interest of the capitalist rulers to 
retard the development of national industry on either a pri­
vate or a cooperative basis.
Proposition VII
These oppressive influences find their limits in countertenden­
cies which capitalism, even in its colonial form, calls into exis­
tence.
The increasing establishment of western transportation and busi­
ness organization inside the ruling community under western adminis­
tration increases the needs of the ruler for educated indigenous 
labor and administrative personnel, and thus quickens the adjustment 
to western productive and power relations.
The unavoidable integration of the colonial territory into world 
trade will accelerate this development, along with spiritual renewal 
and a strengthening of the population's power.
With these counterforces colonial capitalism creates the seeds 
of its own destruction.
Proposition VIII
Capitalism leads to international rivalry in the acquisition of 
even greater colonial possessions, because of the hunt for profits 
by national capitalists, which are accumulated at the expense of the 
welfare interests of the working class.
This imperialism leads to an increase in military expenditures, 
stands in the way of disarmament, and threatens humanity with new 
catastrophic wars.
Proposition IX
On coming to power, social democracy promises a swift dissolution 
of the colonial relationship, if such still exists.
The implementation of a socialist productive mode, especially in 
a tropical land where the economic and social relations differ from 
those in older industrial lands, will find its limits in the particu­
lar economic structure.
However, the transfer of foreign and native industries based on 
western principles into the hands of the indigenous community will 
create the means that will most quickly lead to the acquisition of a 
real economic and social power not possible under foreign rule.
Proposition X
1. In the first place, the colonial work of social democracy will 
be directed toward the elimination of foreign rule. All reforms 
should weaken the colonial relationship and where possible should 
fuse with the demands of the natives.
73
2. It recognizes the right of national independence, but notes that 
the lasting existence of this is only possible if:
a. A native administration is formed out of the population itself 
or at least is generally recognized by the population--with­
out, however, stipulating that a particular form of state or 
administration be adopted as a precondition;
b. This administration has the capacity and is prepared to bear 
the responsibility which the integration of the nation into 
international commerce entails.56
Proposition XI
The struggle of the subjects for national independence, which 
above all must be conducted with its own forces, implies not only 
the liberation of nationally and economically oppressed peoples and 
thus the fulfillment of a social democratic ideal, but is also social 
democracy^ closest ally in the struggle against capitalism and im­
perialism.
Social democracy must support the national struggle with all her 
force and with all means she judges useful, and yet maintain her 
right to judge independently the appropriate means. On this basis 
she untiringly strives toward cooperation with the national movement.
Within the context of this struggle, social democracy must help 
develop the evolution of a social democratic movement on indigenous 
principles. In the meantime, she must also strive toward the eleva­
tion and self-awareness of the indigenous working class.
Proposition XII
In the application of her doctrines and means of struggle, social 
democracy must take into account the economic, social, and religious 
character of the natives and realize that they experience the colo­
nial relationship as a national and racial conflict above all.
The debate at the congress centered around Proposition X, which, 
in this initial form, seemed to place conditions upon Indonesian inde­
pendence .
In presenting this program to the congress, the PB circulated a 
lengthy explanation, which opened with the significant statement that 
van Kol's work on colonial policy had been largely inspired by ethical 
and reformist considerations and thus did not embody social democratic 
principles per se. "It is perhaps best said of van Kol’s position, 
that he followed more of a practical anticapitalist than a principled 
socialist colonial policy."57 The explanation included the observation 
that the rise of Indonesian parties such as the Indische Partij and the 
Sarekat Islam and the impact of Soviet communism upon Asian societies 
had persuaded van Kol to support eventual independence for the Indies.58 
While arguing that the SDAP should now support the struggle of national 
forces within the Dutch East Indies, it warned that the party should 
never lose sight of the fact that such forces were not of a social 
democratic character.59 Calling for a common front against current 
Dutch policy in the Indies, it clearly stressed that this represented
seI b i d pp. 60-61.
57Toelichting^ pp. 3-4. The toeliohting is bound in the end of the Verslag van
het koloniaal oongres3 and has its own pagination, pp. 3-24.
5BIbid.j pp. 4-5. S9Ibid.j pp. 23-24.
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a temporary union of very divergent currents. Finally, the statement 
emphatically rejected the independence now" position of the left- 
opposition: "None of the groups who join in the slogan ffreedom for
Indonesia n o w 1 can seriously believe in its realization in the near 
future. With the acceptance of such a slogan our party would probably 
win the political sympathy of some groups of Indonesians, but it would 
expose itself in a dangerous political gamble leading to its own dis­
appointment and that of the [native] subjects."60 Not content with 
arguing that the Indies were not yet ready for complete independence, 
the PB also contended that the Dutch working class would suffer should 
Indonesia become a sovereign state.61
Discussion at the congress opened with the rapid approval of a 
resolution condemning recent police actions and arrests in the Indies 
aimed against the nationalist movement. Stokvis then stood up to 
introduce the proposed program. Noting that it was a social democratic 
and not an Indonesian program, he nonetheless stressed the great impor­
tance of cooperation with the nationalist movement.
Between colonial socialists and colonial nationalists there exist 
many disagreements. The first seek an alternative productive mode 
and oppose capitalism because it is capitalism. The nationalists 
oppose the same enemy but with an entirely different viewpoint. For 
them, the enemy represents the national oppressor.
Both thus stand on common territory against a common enemy, but 
each has its own goal. This is a basis for cooperation. Both can 
support each other. At the same time one must always take the dif­
ferences into account. It is a modest cooperation.62
Such cooperation, however, would not involve the use of force.
"We want to support the national struggle with those means which, in 
our judgment, are most effective. These means can also be those of the 
Indonesian. But one must not demand that we support and approve all 
Indonesian weapons. We have our own vision."63
Stokvis briefly outlined the stake Dutch labor had in the Indies 
and sternly warned against "immediate" independence.64
The [Netherlands] wage fund derived from the colonies can be divided 
into:
1. Drainage: the flow of profits from land reclamation and exploi­
tation of the Indonesian worker. The profits from this source may 
be valued at around 400 million guilders per year. This profit 
naturally creates employment opportunities; capitalized it amounts 
to 10-17% of the national wealth.
2. Market area for Dutch industry. In 1920, total [Dutch] exports 
had a value of 1700 million guilders of which 14% went to Indonesia.
In 1927, these figures amounted to 1900 million and 7.2%. The tex­
tile industry exported 67.1% of its total production to Indonesia in 
1922. This figure declined to 55.9% in 1928. . . .
3. Market area for personal labor skills. According to van Gelderen 
. . . 43,500 Europeans hold leading positions in Indonesia. This is
60Ibid., p. 19. *'Ibid.y p. 18.
e2Verslag van het koloniaal congress p. 10.
63Ibid.s p. 11. 6^Ibid.3 pp. 13-14.
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the "top layer." The proportion of these people who have come 
directly from the Netherlands may be estimated at 40,000.
For an estimate of the meaning to Dutch labor of an immediate 
breaking of colonial ties, I have consulted our able colleague Dr.
Tinbergen, who calculates, naturally approximately, a loss of em­
ployment for 150,000 Dutch workers, that is to say, about 10% of the 
total.
As expected, P. J. Schmidt delivered a long and rather sharp cri­
tique of the program, directly challenging the Stokvis thesis that the 
European working class benefited from colonies. "I have never found 
figures which reflected the advantage to the working class of colonial 
exploitation."1 65 On the contrary, Schmidt contended, the colonial 
areas constituted a reserve territory which strengthened the position 
of European capitalism over and against the European working class.
"Our point of departure must be that the sooner the colonial relation­
ship dissolves the better the economic position of the workers will 
be. . . . Under all circumstances we must support anticapitalist forces 
which strike modern capitalism in the heart."66 Accordingly, the SDAP 
should press for immediate and unconditional independence for the In­
dies and in pursuing this aim should not rule out the use of force.67
As the debate wore on, J. Albarda, the leader of the SDAP Tweede 
Kamer fraction and in a certain sense the titular head of the SDAP, 
rose to reply to Schmidt. As he had done on previous occasions, Albarda 
argued that the Dutch working class had a powerful vested interest in 
the Indies. "The advantage is obvious. You only have to think about 
the relation of the textile industry to the Indies, which is its great 
market area. There is further the machine industry which fills impor­
tant orders for the sugar industry. . . . The interests of the harbor, 
warehouse and transport workers are tightly connected to the possession 
of the Indies. Ask Drees if the working class in The Hague has any­
thing to do with the Indies. This is true for many other parts of the 
land, the areas around Arnhem, the Gooi, the Bloemendaal area. Indies 
revenue brings purchasing power and prosperity. If this vanished sud­
denly, there would be an economic crisis."68 Although Albarda sup­
ported the position that the Indies should be led toward eventual inde­
pendence and rejected schemes for giving the area dominion status, the 
thrust of his argument was to imply preconditions for that independence 
and to require sustained economic connections between Holland and its for­
mer colony. He stressed also that rapid, unconditional independence 
could result in American or Japanese seizure of the Indies. "Would 
Japan and the United States calmly write off their interests in the 
Indies? Or would they intervene? Then the workers must intervene to 
prevent a war, says Schmidt. But the American and Japanese workers 
have not come this far. The Indies would be occupied. The new rule 
over the Indies would be far worse than the Dutch."69 In spite of the 
seemingly wide gap between the positions staked out, the two wings of 
the party finally accepted a compromise revision of the controversial 
Proposition X which ran as follows:
1. Social Democracy unconditionally recognizes the right of national 
independence.
65Ibid.3 p. 19.
6BIbid., p. 27.
66Ibid.3 p. 21. 
69Ibid., p . 29.
67 Ibid.3 pp. 23-24.
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2. In the first place, her colonial work shall thus be directed 
toward the elimination of foreign rule. All reforms should weaken 
the colonial relationship and, where possible, should fuse with the 
demands of the natives. Colonial work must thus create the possibil­
ity to pursue an independent foreign trade policy.
Without more ado, the twelve propositions were then accepted by 
the congress.70
Political Antecedents of Planisme
Hardly had this colonial policy been formulated when the colonial 
issue as a whole was pushed into the background by the magnitude of the 
depression crisis. In 1929, 27,775 laborers were registered as unem­
ployed, a figure which constituted about 6-7 percent of the labor force. 
By 1931, unemployment had risen to 96,000 (15.3 percent).71 The crisis 
continued to deepen, and the level of unemployment rose to a peak of 
just under 500,000 (33 percent of the labor force) during a number of 
months in 1936. Throughout the period between 1933 and 1938 about
400,000 were out of work.72
The SDAP experienced an internal crisis as well. The spokesmen 
for a more active colonial policy were expelled from the party shortly 
after the 1930 congress after a bitter factional fight. In 1932, Schmidt 
and Jacques de Kadt created their own separate splinter party, the 
Onafhankelijk Socialistische Partij (Independent Socialist Party).73 *
No sooner had this internal crisis passed than the party leader­
ship was presented with a difficult new colonial issue of considerable 
political consequence. On February 4, 1933, members of the crew of 
the cruiser De Zeven Provinoien mutinied as the ship was moving through 
waters northwest of Sumatra.7  ^ The immediate cause of the mutiny was 
an announcement that naval salaries would be lowered by 7 percent as of 
January 1, 1933; a subsequent clarification specified that Indonesian 
salaries would be cut by 7 percent, while European crewmen’s pay would
7°Ibid., pp. 45-46.
71Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Rijk in Europa. Jaareijfers 1932 (The 
Hague: Landsdrukkerij, 1933), p. 99.
72For a brief discussion of the unemployment problem, see Windmuller, Labor 
Relations, pp. 66-67.
73The expulsion of Schmidt and de Kadt did not follow from their position on 
the Indies, but rather from their refusal to halt publication of De Fakkel, a modest 
newspaper which they edited and from which they launched attacks upon the SDAP's par­
liamentary delegation, the PB, and the party daily, Het Volk. Contending that the 
liberal capitalist world, along with its colonial holdings, was facing the ultimate 
crisis, they insisted that social democratic strategy be radicalized and extraparlia­
mentary actions undertaken, measures which the SDAP leadership bitterly opposed. For 
Schmidt’s defense of his position, see the minutes of the Haarlem congress, Verslag 
van het seven en dertigste oongres der Soaiaal-Democratisehe Arbeiderspartij in Neder­
land, gehouden op zaterdag 26, zondag 27 en maandag 28 Maart 1932, te Haarlem, pp. 
14-18.
7**The following account is based upon the recent study by J. C. H. Blom, De 
muterij op de Zeven Provinoien (Bussum: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1975).
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be lowered by only 4 percent. The cruiser was quickly invested by 
military vessels and placed under air reconnaissance. Although the 
mutineers had telegraphed reports that the imprisoned officers were in 
good health and expressed their intention to put into port and disem­
bark, a dive-bomber struck the cruiser as it approached the southeast­
ern tip of Sumatra on February 10. The crew immediately surrendered 
and the ship was boarded. During the six-day period of the mutiny, 
and especially during its aftermath, the SDAP parliamentary delegation 
and Eet Volk, while not endorsing the crewmen’s actions, did argue that 
they were the result of government policy. The SDAP parliamentary 
delegation, especially F. M. Wibaut in the upper house and Albarda in 
the Tweede Kamer, strongly denounced the bombing as a totally unjusti­
fied use of force. The response of the Defense Ministry was an imme­
diate ban on the circulation of SDAP and NVV publications in military 
quarters and an announced refusal to employ any member of the SDAP, 
the NVV, the Communist Party, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, or the 
Unafhankelijk Socialistische Partij. During the 1933 parliamentary 
election, the SDAP found itself in an awkward position. The bourgeois 
parties denounced the mutiny and charged that the SDAP was a party of 
insurrection and revolution; the Communist Party, the Revolutionary 
Socialist Party, and the Onafhankelijk Socialistische Partij all 
strongly endorsed the mutiny and attacked the SDAP for timidity and 
lack of principle in refusing to join them in this stand. As a result, 
and in spite of the depression crisis, the SDAP did poorly at the 
polls: its share of the popular vote fell from 23.8 percent to 21.4
percent.75
Stunned by the slump and dismayed by its dim electoral perfor­
mance, the SDAP struggled to find a new programmatic line. At a meet­
ing of the Party Council, a body which grouped together the SDAP and 
NVV leadership, Albarda attributed the election disaster partially to 
the Zeven Provineien affair and partially to the stand the SDAP had 
taken against rearmament.76 In addition, the SDAP was failing to at­
tract young voters and was losing the support it had once enjoyed among 
intellectuals. On June 10, 1933, the PB decided to form a special com­
mission (the Herzieningscommissie) to study the strategy and tactics 
of the SDAP and to recommend possible changes. Moving with unusual 
speed, the commission produced its report by October of 1933. The main 
thrust of the report was to recommend program revisions aimed at wi n ­
ning agrarian and middle class support. Colonial policy was peripheral 
to this task, and probably for this reason no real change in the 1930 
program was advocated:77
Our commission has discussed the question whether it should be 
recommended that the paragraph [X] be changed to preclude in the 
future false presentations of the principles and aims of the party 
in the area of colonial work. It has unanimously decided not to do 
so.
75Verslag over het jaar 1 9 3 3 p. 42, bound in Verslag van het veertigste eon- 
gres der Socicual-Demoeratisehe Arbeiderspartij in Nederland.
76Van Hulst, Pleysier, and Scheffer, Eet roode vaandely pp. 256-57.
77Rapport van de "Eerzieningseommissie" der S.D.A.P. (Amsterdam: De Arbeiders- 
pers, 1933), p. 49.
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The Development of Planisme
The larger significance of the report was that, in spite of its 
understandable emphasis on defense issues, given the abrupt emergence 
of the Third Reich in the course of 1933, it signaled a move toward 
planisme. The commission noted that while it had no mandate to formu­
late a specific program to move Dutch society toward the realization 
of a socialist state, there was an urgent need for the completion of such 
a concrete program in the near future.78 On February 10, 1934, Albar- 
da proposed to the PB the creation of a scientific bureau, which would 
work with a new commission to draft the proposed comprehensive program. 
Albarda's move was endorsed by the 1934 congress, held at Utrecht, as 
follows:
The congress of the SDAP
judges that the time has come to direct the efforts of the party 
toward the rationalization of economic life and to call for coopera­
tion with the efforts of all anticapitalist forces to realize, with 
the SDAP, the implementation of democratic socialism as the way out 
of social misery; convinced that, although the reports of the social­
ization commission, as well as the reports on business organization 
and codetermination and on new organs, give important directions for 
the transition to socialism, there now exists an urgent need to de­
velop concrete particulars on the first measures to be taken;
calls on the Partij Bestuur to create a scientific bureau, which, 
in cooperation with a joint commission to be named by the NW, will 
develop a plan which begins to make this transition; . . .79
On May 4, 1934, the engineer H. Vos was named director of the 
Scientific Bureau.80 Under him would serve G. van der Bergh, J. van 
Gelderen (the bureau's colonial expert)-, the young economist Jan Tin­
bergen, who in a later era would be recognized as one of the world's 
leading econometricians, and the engineer Theodore van der Waerden.
At a later date A. W. Ijzerman was added to the group. The S D A P - N W  
planning commission was composed of Albarda, W. Drees, J. W. Matthijsen, 
and Koos Vorrink of the SDAP, and H. J. van Braambeek. J. Brautigam,
E. Kupers, and F. van Meurs of the N W .  After an organizational meet­
ing on July 3, 1934, the two groups began their work under great pres­
sure .81
The major themes in their draft plan were first presented to a 
congress of SDAP and N W  leaders on April 22, 1935.82 Vos, Albarda, 
and Kuypers were the main speakers. In July, well before the text of 
the Plan was published, a Centrale Plan Commissie (Central Plan Com­
mission) composed of Albarda, S. de la Bella, E. Kupers, C. van der
7BIbid., p. 62.
79Verslag van het veertigste aongres der Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij 
in Nederland, gehouden op zaterdag 31 Maori, zondag 1 en Maandag 2 April 1934 te
Utrecht, pp. 58-59.
BOVerslag over het jaar 1934, p. 55, bound in Verslag van het een en veertigste 
congres der Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland.
B^Ibid., p. 55.
e2Verslag over het jaar 1935, p. 50, bound in Verslag van het ttiee en veertigste
congres der Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland.
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Lende, F. S. Noordhoff, G. van der Veen, Vos, Vorrink, H. B. Wiardi 
Beckman, and C. Woudenberg (the SDAP secretary) was formed to direct 
the political agitation for the Plan and coordinate propaganda measures. 
The Commission immediately placed the weekly news-sheet Vrigheid, Ar­
beid, Brood (Freedom, Work, Bread) under its control, adding as a sub­
title the words Plan van de Arbeid.33 (Edited by Meyer Sluyser, a 
skilled and sophisticated journalist, Vrigheid, Arbeid, Brood had been 
created in 1933 as part of a broad antifascist campaign by the SDAP and 
NVV in response to the formation of the Third Reich in neighboring Ger­
many and the continuing growth of national socialist currents inside 
the Netherlands itself. 8tf) The aim of the Commission was to link the 
new Plan program to the broad political struggle that social democracy 
felt itself facing. In the autumn of 1935, a massive Plan congress, 
including both SDAP and N W  delegates, was held in Utrecht. In the 
course of a series of resolutions defining the contours of Plan social­
ism, the following position on the Indies was adopted.85
Vigorous promotion of the standard of living of the native population 
of Indonesia and expansion of the internal market. Alteration of the 
economic structure so that the Indonesian community is less dependent 
upon western cultivation. As crisis policy, the initiation of a pub­
lic works program and improvement of housing conditions. Help from 
the Netherlands with the financing of crisis measures. Lasting eco­
nomic recovery through the promotion of cultivations practiced by the 
Indonesians; through industrialization, particularly joined with al­
ready existing native industry, with help when necessary from invest­
ment funds backed by the state; through economic information, good 
credit organization and producer organization. Improvement and ra­
tionalization of the transport system. Promotion of the interests of 
the Indonesians in the trade policy of the Netherlands.
In the meantime, the Central Plan Commission had hurriedly estab­
lished the framework for a considerable cadre. By 1936, 659 local Plan 
commissions had been established in villages, towns, and major cities. 
Cadre instruction started as early as the autumn of 1935. Speakers 
were dispatched to work with clusters of local cadres under the general 
supervision of the SDAP's Instituut voor Arbeidersontwikkeling (Insti­
tute for Workers' Development). Between 1935 and the parliamentary 
elections of 1937, the party launched a massive propaganda drive on 
behalf of its vaunted Plan, only to meet bitter disappointment once 
again. In the 1937 poll, the SDAP share of the popular vote registered 
an increase of less than 0.6 percent.86
Partly as a result of this setback, but more as an outcome of 
growing rivalry between Albarda and the NVV leader de la Bella, the 
General Council of the SDAP and N W  suddenly voted to halt their joint
B3Ibid.} p. 50.
81+For a discussion of the origins of Vrigheid, Arbeid, Brood and the role Meyer 
Sluyser played in editing the forum, see van Hulst, Pleysier, and Scheffer, Ret roode 
vaandel!> pp. 266-69.
BSVerslag over het gaar 1935, p. 55, bound in Verslag van het twee en veertigste 
oongres der Sociaal-Demooratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland.
66Verslag over het gaar 1937, p. 38, bound in Verslag van het vier en veertigste
oongres der Sooiaal Demooratisohe Arbeiderspartig in Nederland.
80
agitation, to dissolve the Central Plan Commission and its local 
branches, and to halt publication of Vrijheid, Arbeid, Brood.87 It 
appears that Albarda feared that de la Bella was trying to subordinate 
the SDAP to the trade union leadership.* 88 Since the partnership b e ­
tween the two had always been based on the premise that the N W  would 
concentrate on pushing the socioeconomic demands of labor while the 
SDAP fulfilled a more general political mission, the decision to dis­
solve the joint agitational structure for the Plan served to reempha­
size the party's political autonomy. But the result was that, although 
the Plan van de Arbeid remained an integral part of the SDAP program, 
the enthusiasm it had generated in the party in 1935-36 waned dramati­
cally and for good.
Evaluating the Plan
In evaluating the Plan van de Arbeid, one has to bear in mind the 
extremely difficult circumstances under which it was drawn up. Although 
it had purged its left wing in 1932, the SDAP was torn from within by 
bitter debate over the Zeven Provinoien affair and over "law and order" 
issues in general. Between 1933 and 1935, J. E. W. Duijs, for years 
one of the stalwarts of the SDAP parliamentary delegation, continually 
charged that the party was insufficiently anticommunist, was supportive 
of mutiny, violence, and disorder, and was overreacting to fascist cur­
rents in the Netherlands.89 Duijs's attacks were seconded by Professor 
J. Goudriaan, who even resigned from the party in protest at the lead­
ership's refusal to condemn the mutiny. Henri Polak, veteran labor 
leader and the author of a regular column in Bet Volk, strongly pro­
tested the shift in accent from anticommunism and antifascism to 
planisme.90 Consistently rejecting popular front actions in tandem 
with communist, syndicalist, or left-socialist groups, but also opposed 
to the tough "law and order" line taken in both the Netherlands and the 
Indies by the Colijn regimes, the party leadership sought to restore 
its credibility, meet the needs of the times,, and expand its constitu­
ency by building on its tradition of sober institutional innovation.
The Plan van de Arbeid was in part the culmination of a long 
series of reports issued by the SDAP and N W  since 1920.91 Although 
addressed to different issues, all these reports had tried to develop 
social democratic programs in terms of specific and concrete institu­
B7Ibid., p. 43.
88There is an extremely interesting discussion of this issue in van Hulst, 
Pleysier, and Scheffer, Bet roode vaandel, pp. 283-84.
B9Ibid., pp. 256-57. Duijs was finally expelled from the SDAP in 1935, when he 
refused to sit with the parliamentary delegation.
BOIbid., p. 282.
91First came the Soaialisatievraagstuk (The Socialization Question) in 1920, 
followed by Bedrijfsorganisatie en medezeggensahap (Business Organization and Codeter­
mination) in 1923, Rapport over bedrijfsleven en verruiming der arbeidsmarkt in Neder­
land (Report on the State of Business and the Expansion of the Labor Market in the 
Netherlands) in 1930, Nieuwe Orgccnen (New Institutes) in 1931, Bet landbouw vraagstuk 
(The Agrarian Question) in 1933, and the Rapport van de Berzieningsoormrissie (The 
Report of the Revision Commission) in 1933.
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tional proposals for various sectors of the economy. All were based 
on the assumption that such institutional and structural innovations 
could and would be realized through acts of parliament. Like its pre­
decessors, the Plan was aimed at both short- and long-term goals. It 
was intended to combat the economic crisis and also to lay the institu­
tional foundations for the eventual realization of socialism at some 
later date.
In its overall design, the Plan supported the creation of powerful 
governmental organs which would plan and direct production in the pri­
vate sector of the economy, supervise an expansion of housing construc­
tion and the transportation infrastructure, and would foster further 
industrialization. Government control and direction would serve to 
rationalize production and harmonize it with social needs. Rationali­
zation itself would diminish, or, hopefully, even eliminate business 
cycles, with their disastrous effects on production and the labor mar­
ket. Foreign trade was also to be subject to governmental controls to 
ensure satisfaction of the population’s needs. The Plan’s immediate 
priorities were a massive series of public works programs, designed to 
cut unemployment by half92 and to revive the economy by stimulating a 
dramatic increase in public purchasing power.
The last chapter of the Plan dealt with the Indies and was authored 
by van Gelderen, the colonial expert for the Scientific Bureau, assisted 
by Cramer, Stokvis, and L. N. Palar. Taken within the context of the 
entire 312-page volume, the policy statement on the Indies was brief, 
covering only fourteen pages in all. It was also quite narrowly ad­
dressed to strictly socioeconomic problems. There was no mention of 
democratization of the Volksraad or the colonial civil service. Not a 
word was said of the political forces in the Indies. Even the proposed 
economic policies were such as could be carried out immediately and 
within the existing colonial framework. Such standard socialist poli­
cies as the collectivization of agriculture, the formation and strength­
ening of rural cooperatives, and the creation of state enterprises were 
mostly mentioned in only a most general sense and often by implication 
alone. Existing productive modes were the report’s real frame of ref­
erence .
The main policy areas discussed were agriculture, industrializa­
tion, public works, and terms of trade with the Netherlands and Japan.
A new course in agricultural policy was described only in the vaguest 
and most general terms. ’’Changes in the economic structure must be 
directed toward an increase in the standard of living, thus an increase 
of purchasing power on the domestic market, and a termination of the 
one-sided dependency upon western cultures.”93 While arguing that the 
cultivation of export crops should be curtailed, the report was obscure 
on what should take their place. At one point, it seemed to suggest 
that relief from rural poverty could come only from industrialization 
and a transformation of the productive infrastructure. Yet industrial­
ization had to be preceded by a strengthening of domestic markets.
The consequences of the crisis have been very serious in Indone­
sia and have led to an almost total collapse of the ”western” busi-
92Het plan van de arbeid (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1935), p. 53.
93Ibid.i p. 298.
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nesses, that is to say cultures and other undertakings run in a 
European manner which for the most part are aimed at the export 
market. . . .
The policy to follow in Indonesia is parallel in its broad con­
tours with that which the Plan proposes for the Netherlands. As 
crisis policy the implementation of public works for the reestablish­
ment of the standard of living and an expansion of the capacity of 
the domestic market is urged.
As policy for further recovery it is important, next to a strong 
promotion of Indonesian cultures, industrialization, and an improve­
ment of transportation, to choose what can partially be done by pub­
lic works with regard to these factors.
There exists in Indonesia an even closer connection than in our 
land between an increase in the standard of living and industriali­
zation. Industrialization always has as a condition the development 
of the domestic market which must support an increase in the stan­
dard of living.9t*
The report*s main stress was placed on public works promotion and 
how it should be financed. The Dutch government should transfer 100 
million guilders to the account of the colonial administration, which 
would then initiate a major series of construction projects.95 The 
loan would be handled in such a way as to eliminate a service burden 
on the existing colonial budget. **We contend that the Indonesian bud­
get at the moment should not and cannot bear the interest and redemp­
tion costs of this sum. One possible way to prevent this is for the 
Netherlands to raise a public loan of this amount with the sum to be 
transferred to Indonesia as an interest free advance. The raising of 
this loan on the free market will increase the Dutch national debt and 
the state budget will have to carry the interest and redemption costs 
for the first few years. Another possibility is that the Indies borrow 
the sum directly, with the loan guaranteed by the Netherlands, and that 
the Netherlands pay the interest and redemption costs for the first 
few years.**96 The funding of public works would create primary employ­
ment for 200,000 Indonesians. The report confidently concluded that 
the resultant demand for goods and services would create an additional
300,000 jobs.97
To foster long-term industrialization, the report called in rather 
general terms for the creation of state-controlled investment funds 
which would extend capital loans to the private sector. !,The sums 
available do not have to be especially large. . . .  In connection with 
the businesses which these investment funds serve, an administrative 
form must be selected in which Indonesian interests are strongly repre­
sented.**98 A number of target industries were suggested.
The report also urged an improvement of the transportation infra­
structure, presumably at state expense, although this was not specifi­
cally spelled out. **Beyond the expansion of industry, the promotion 
of the transport system in Indonesia is also possible. Small auto 
transport, which in Indonesia has a very good future, can be expanded. 
We further add that in Indonesia a general rationalization of transport 
is also necessary, above all a rationalization of transport in trams
"Ibid., pp. 298-99. 
"Ibid. , p. 305.
"Ibid., p. 302. "Ibid. 97I b i d p. 303.
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and autobuses. Next to highway transport, transport by water, involv­
ing small ships for native produce, needs to be promoted.1,99
Virtually one-half of the Indies section of the report dealt with 
the terms of trade rather than productive forces internal to the colony 
itself. Noting the growing importance of Japanese trade with the In­
dies, the report stressed its positive aspects. "The relationship be­
tween Indonesia and Japan has different aspects which within the con­
text of the Plan can only be handled in a few lines. First, it is a 
complementary connection. Indonesia is a raw materials land. Japan 
is developing into an industrial state. Beyond this the relation be­
tween the standard of living in Indonesia and Japan lessens the dis­
tance between the two. . . .  A good division of labor between the two 
lands must be applauded and promoted as an unqualified benefit."100 
At the same time, it cautioned, again in rather general terms, against 
excessive Japanese economic penetration of the islands. The Indies* 
trade relations with the Netherlands were seen in the following terms:
In the economic relationship of the Netherlands to Indonesia in 
terms of each other*s exports, the trade policy regulations which 
the Netherlands can adopt play an important role. . . . The Nether­
lands has a very large import surplusy although this has become dra­
matically smaller. In contrast, Indonesia has an important export 
surplus. In terms of trade policy, the Netherlands ought to strive 
toward three~cornered treaties in which nations from whom our land 
imports more than it sells take Indonesian produce as compensation 
for this surplus.101
The concluding section of the policy statement contained an inter­
esting evaluation of the impact planisme might have upon the Twente 
textile complex and its role in the Dutch East Indies. "For textile 
producers, exports from the Netherlands to Indonesia are of great 
importance. . . . For employment in the Dutch textile industry [quotas] 
are important, while it also appears important to us that a complete 
conquest of the market by Japan be prevented by [imposition of] quotas. 
Nevertheless, it seems that, with the exception of some special items, 
the market for Twente is lost in view of developments in the East.
Seen from a global perspective Twente does not appear to be the best 
place to manufacture goods for Indonesia out of American raw materials. 
A declining quota for Twente goods thus ought to be established.**102 
In sum, the Central Plan Commission sought to apply the same public 
works policies to the Indies that it proposed for the Netherlands.
Related Developments
Subsequent to the publication of the Plan, the Central Plan Com­
mission distributed two important handbooks, Handboek voor het Plan van 
de Arbeid (1936) and Ons plan na een jaar (1936). It is indicative of
the minimal party concern with the Indies in the late 1930s that neither 
made any mention of the colony. Similarly, when H. Vos, director of 
the Scientific Bureau, published a brief essay entitled De maatschappij 
verandert in 1937 (the year the SDAP and NVV dropped their joint agita­
tion for the Plan), he made only a few casual references to the Indies.
"Ibid, s pp. 304-5. 
'[02‘Ibid. y pp. 310-11.
100Ibid.y p. 307. 101Ibid.y pp. 308-9.
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It is worth remembering, too, that during the drive for planisme, 
the SDAP maintained only fleeting contact with political forces in the 
Indies. After the 1930 colonial congress, the PB appointed a commis­
sion to draft a colonial working program.103 The commission, which 
consisted of Albarda, Cramer, M. Mendels, J. Oudegeest, P. J. Schmidt, 
Stokvis, J. L. Vleming, W. Vliegen, N. Vijlbrief, D. J. A. Westerveld, 
and Daan van der Zee, finally published a working program in 1932, but 
it played a very minor role in the collective life of the party. In 
1931, the SDAP?s annual congress condemned the arrest of Sukarno and 
the harassment of the nationalist movement by colonial security offi­
cials.10** A number of protest demonstrations were held, and Stokvis 
published a brochure defending Sukarno and denouncing the colonial re­
gime. When Sukarno was released at the end of 1931, the PB dispatched 
a goodwill telegram.105 In 1933, the PB moved to create a permanent 
colonial commission, composed of both N W  and SDAP notables, to provide 
information on the SDAP's colonial policy in both the Netherlands and 
the Indies.106 As a result, a press bureau called Persindo (Persbureau 
Indonesia) was established in Amsterdam under the directorship of 
Palar.107 * Persindo was supposed to transmit articles dealing with 
Dutch social democracy to newspapers in the Indies, and, where neces­
sary, to provide Indonesian translations. In his annual report for 
1933, however, the SDAP secretary, C. Woudenberg, noted how scanty the 
contact was even between the SDAP and the ISDP. "Relations with the 
ISDP during the past year were only moderate. The contact could have 
been better. The difficulties with which our party comrades in Indo­
nesia have to deal are very great as a result of the extraordi­
narily reactionary actions of the government.M108 Within a year, 
Persindo*s services were cut off by colonial security forces. In his 
annual report for 1935, Woudenberg bitterly observed that:
In the beginning of 1935, however, Persindo dispatches had to be 
stopped because, on orders from the government, they were no longer 
permitted by the post office. In the Volksraad and in the two Kamers 
we asked for an explanation. The General Council of the SDAP and N W  
has requested an explanation in writing from the Governor-General, 
without satisfactory results. However, the issue is still being 
negotiated.109
Dispatches to the Indies were resumed later in 1935, but they came from 
the Persdienst SDAP and the Persdienst N W .  It was not until 1937 that 
the colonial regime allowed Persindo to resume transmissions. From
i°3Verslag over het jaar 1930> p. 81, bound in Verslag van het zes en dertigste
oongres der Sooiaal-Demooratisohe Arbeiderspartij in Nederland.
10** Verslag van het zes en dertigste oongres der Sociaal-Demooratisohe Arbeids- 
partij in Nederland, gehouden op zaterdag 43 zondag 6 en maandag 6 April 19313 p. 76.
'X0SVerslag over het jaar 1931, pp. 78-79, bound in Verslag van het zeven en
dertigste oongres der Soeiaal-Demooratisehe Arbeiderspartij in Nederland.
1°6Verslag over het jaar 19333 p. 67, bound in Verslag van het veertigste oon­
gres der Sociaal-Demooratisohe Arbeiderspartij in Nederland.
107Ibid.3 p. 67. 103Ibid. 3 pp. 67-68.
'X09Verslag over het jaar 19353 p. 71, bound in Verslag van het twee en veer­
tigste oongres der Sociaal-Demooratisohe Arbeiderspartij in Nederland.
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then on until the coming of war, the colonial commission's activities 
revolved almost exclusively around this news bureau.110
Conclusion: The SDAP and the Indies
Confronted by massive unemployment and a series of hostile and 
highly conservative coalitions headed by Colijn, trapped in permanent 
opposition and lacking any influence over governmental policy, the 
SDAP was forced increasingly to concentrate on internal issues as the 
1930s wore on. This inwardness was compounded by the emergence of the 
Third Reich on Holland's eastern frontier and the problems posed by 
the appearance of National Socialism inside the Netherlands itself. 
Colonial issues were of even less concern to the SDAP and NVV rank-and- 
file than previously. Yet despite the indifference, Est Volk continued 
to publish a regular column on the Indies, usually written by Stokvis, 
throughout the depression decade. The party did maintain a press ser­
vice fdr the colony, and when the Plan van de Arbeid was drafted, a 
modest attempt was made to define the role of the Indies in a new 
socioeconomic order.
To the extent that the SDAP fell short of the mark, its failings 
were shared by other European social democratic parties. Social democ­
racy did not emerge as a strong force in the postcolonial Afro-Asian 
world. Nationalist or communist movements constituted the wave of the 
future, not social democracy. In the case of the Dutch East Indies, 
one reason for this situation was undoubtedly the relative indifference 
of the SDAP toward the nationalist movement. The ISDP, its Indies 
counterpart, remained a small grouping of largely European office work­
ers, many of whom were employees of the colonial establishment itself. 
Lacking roots in the Indonesian population, the ISDP also maintained 
only the most fragile contact with Europe. By the same token, through 
its refusal to endorse the slogan of immediate independence for Indo­
nesians, the SDAP cut itself off from the broad currents of political 
life in the colony. However sincere and well-intended the SDAP idea 
of transition to self-government may have been, to Indonesian activists 
it certainly must have had a ring of self-interest. It allowed commu­
nists both in the Netherlands and in the Indies to charge the party 
with "social imperialism" with considerable success. Though its Plan 
van de Arbeid showed the SDAP leadership to be concerned with the so­
cial welfare of the Indonesians, the Plan's omission of any attractive 
political proposals which might have begun the realization of the very 
"self-governance" the SDAP itself proposed, confirmed the party's in­
ability to build any long-term coherent relationship with the popular 
movement in the colony.
110See the annual Jaarverslagen of the party secretary, 1937-39.
